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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH
I. J WAGNER and ILENE J. WAGNER,
hushand and wife, and
WALLACE A. WRIGHT, JR., and
JERALYN T. WRIGHT,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No.

12618

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMUNT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiffs and Appellants for
declaratory judgment that a State statute, the Utah Underground
Conversion of Utilities Law, and an ordinance of Salt Lake
City enacted pu:suant to such statute, are each invalid and unconstitutional and for an injunction against the Defendant from
undertaking any further proceedings in connection with
Underground Conversion of Utilities District Number 8-F-lA.

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment based
upon the proceedings on file and a stipulation of facts entered
into between the parties. After argument, the District Court
determined that there was no dispute as to any material faces
that the statute and ordinance were constitutional and tha;
the injunction requested should be denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent seeks the sustaining of the Dis.
trict Court judgment and a holding that the statute and ordi·
nance involved are constitutional and that the injunction
prayed for should be denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Respondent accept the statement of facts as
contained in the Plaintiff-Appellants' Brief.
The Utah Underground Conversion of Utilities Law en·
acted in the 1969 regular session of the Utah Legislature in ,
Chapter 157, Laws of Utah, 1969, and compiled in the Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as Sections 54-8-1 through 54-8-30,
will be referred to in the Brief as "State Statute".
The Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City by ordi· :
nance passed October 27, 1970, which became effective on
its publication on November 18, 1970, adopted an ord'1 ~~nce
which substantially re-enacts for Salt Lake City the prov15tonl
.
· found as Chapter 7ol
of the State Statute. Such ord mance
is
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Title 39 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah
1953. This ordinance is sometimes referred to in this Brief
as "the Ordinance".
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCE ARE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND IBEY DO NOT
AUTHORIZE PUBLIC ACTION FOR A PRIVATE PURPOSE, NOR LEND IBE CREDIT OF
A MUNICIPALITY FOR A PRIVATE PURPOSE
NOR DELEGATE MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS TO
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.
The safeguards of the Act which are hereafter recited,
provide more than adequate protection to the property owners
in the improvement district. More hearings, more opportunities to object and eventually an opportunity to test the matter
in the courts are given each property owner included in the
district.
State Statutes §54-8-6; Ordinance §39-7-6, clearly indicate that only by and under the initiative of the property owners
can two-thirds of those property owners commence the improvement district. Certainly then, the negative is true. If
over one-third of the property owners or those who owned over
one-third of the value of the property in the improvement district objected to the improvement district, at any stage, the
local governing body must abandon the district no matter who
instigated it. State Statute §54-8-4 and Ordinance §39-7-4
simply are but a preamble to the law indicating what the
Underground Conversion of Utilities Law is about.
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A.

The State Statute and Ordinance Do Not Auth or.
ize Public Action and Taxation For a Private Pur.
pose.

In Wicks v. Salt Lake City, et al, 60 Utah 265, 208 P.538
( 1922) the plaintiff sought to prohibit Salt Lake City from
issuing certain special improvement bonds for a street lighting
district. That district was on State Street between South Tern.
ple and Fourth South. This Court concluded in that street
lighting case the following:

"In the light of these decisions and the various
statutes referred to there can be no doubt as to the
power of the City to light the streets of the City, or any
section thereof, by draft upon the general funds. If
the City elects, however, to organize a district as in the
instant case, and levy a special tax on abutting prop·
erty to pay the taxes, and issue bonds therefor, it is
equally free from doubt that the City has the power to
establish a special improvement guarantee fund to
secure the payment of the bonds as provided in the
Act of 1921." (page 540)

B.

The State Statute and Ordinance Do Not Author·
ize a Lending of Public Credit for Private Pur·
poses Contrary to the Utah Constitution.

A significant question is whether there is, under this Act,
a lending of public credit for a private purpose. The Supreme
Court of Utah looked at a similar question in 1960, in the
matter of State Road Commission of Utah v. Utah Power and
Light Company, 10 U.2d 333, 353 P.2d 171. In that case the
Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine that the legislature had
h utilities of
.
the power to change the common 1aw to re 11eve t e
· f ao-r·
the obligation to pay the costs of relocating
1nes andto
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impose the cost on the State, for highway relocation. This
became an issue by the advent of Federal highway programs
which forced the relocation of utilities because of the realignment of the highways. The question arose as to who should
ultimately pay for the relocation costs occasioned by the new
highways. The courts found that relocations could be ordered
by the police power of the State for the benefit of all the people. In StC1te Road Commission of Utah v. Utah Power and
Light Comp"ny, 10 Utah 2d 333, 353 P.2d 171, the Court
opined:
The legislature has determined the policy to be
pursued in the relocation of utility facilities; and, mindful of the magnitude of the newly inaugurated federal
program and the equitities to be adjusted as fixed in
advance the terms upon which relocation shall be required. There is no gain to the utilities. They are simply protected from suffering a net loss in the relocation
of their facilities all resulting from this vast and farflung highway building program.
In the highway relocation case, the public purpose is the
need of new highways; correspondingly, the need to move the
utilities. In the instant case, the need is safety and aesthetics;
both, the legislature has determined, are the public policy of
this State In each instance the utility ends up owning the improvements, and in both cases, the measure called for money
coming directly to the utility from the State. In the Utah Power
and Light case, supra, payment is made directly from the State
from gasoline tax revenues, to the utility; and in the case at
hand, payment is made through a special improvement district,
funded by bonds, which bonds are paid for out of assessments
from the property owners immediately adjacent to the improvements.

;

The Court in the Utah Power and Light case ' supra, fur.
ther stated:
The numerical weight of authority holds th
under constitutional limitations similar to those in u ~
the legislature has the power to change the commta
law to relieve ~e util_i~i~ of the obligation to pay ~~
cost of relocating faoliues and to impose the cost
the State. (Citations)
on
The Court apparently relied heavily upon Justice Car.
dozo's opinion in Oswego and Syracuse R. Co. v. State, 226
N.Y. 351, 124 N.E. 8 and quoted extensively from that opinion.
There are analogies between the relocation and burying
of overhead utilities because of highway construction versus
the public desire for beautification and safety which is involved
in this act. In both cases, the utilities owned the facilities prior
and in both cases the utilities owned the facilities at the end
of the improvement. In the case of the highways, the funds to
relocate the utilities came from the gasoline tax imposed on
all of the citizens alike whether or not they favored relocation
of the utilities or the burying of the utilities. In this act, pay·
ment is made by those who live in the improvement district
and who most directly benefit from the improvement. That is
not to say that in both cases those who may not pay a gasoline
taX and those who may not live in the improvement district
don't benefit from the improvements. They do. In both in·
stances the unsightliness of the utilities are gone.

It may be argued that the utilities are getting a new c~r
10
at no cost to them, when they only had an old car before
the form of the old utility system. By way of analogy, we urge
. t h at 1t
· 1s
· not a new car the utilities are
this Court to recogmze
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getting but a new fender on an old car inasmuch as this district
represents bur a small portion of the utility systems' entire grid
throughout the city and county and the State. To further the
analogy '" e suggest that a new fender on an old car does not
make for a new car.
In Allen v. Tooele County, 21 U.2d 383, 445 P.2d 994
( 1968) the Court upheld a Tooele County plan, pursuant to
legislztive act, to issue bonds to finance the construction of industrial facilities. Upon their completion, the facilities were to
be leased to private corporations. The bonds were to be issued
under the name of the county, but were to be repaid by rentals
from the constructed facilities. This public purpose directly
benefited private corporations. The court said in upholding
the legislation:
The final point we comment on is the plaintiff's
charge that the Act must be held invalid because of the
lack of a substantial public purpose. This question has
been determined at three levels preceding the prerogative of this court to make such a determination.
The first is the legislature; the second is the county
commission; and the third is the trial court. All of them
appear to have regarded industrial development as a
proper public purpose. In deference to those prior
prerogations, this court would not upset such determination, except upon a persuasive showing that it was so
clearly an error as to be capricious and arbitrary, a
circumstance we do not find present here." See Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Company, 301
U.S. 495, 57 Sup. Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245 (1937) and
also Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 U. 237, 48 P.2d 530.
In the present case, both the State Legislature and the
City Commission have determined that it is a desirable public
purpose to remove overhead utilities. The question remains

7

as to whether there has been a lending of public cre<lit. In
Allen v. Tooele County, mpra, this court said in commenting
on the bonds issued by Tooele County:
It is t? be stated o~ the face of the bonds that in
no event will they constitute an indebtedness to Tooele
County or a charge against the $en~r~l credit or taxing
powers of the County, all of which is m accord with the
provisions of the Act. Inasmuch as the bonds are pay·
able only out of the income to be derived from the
leasing of the plant, and no resort can be had against
the County or its taxpayers, it is our opinion that the
project is not a "lending of credit of the County as
was intended to be prohibited by Sec. 31 of Article
VI of the Utah Constitution.

In another case, Utah State Land Board v. Utah State
Finance Commission, 12 U.2d 265, 365 P.2d 213 ( 1961),
this Court, in a case involving the State Land Board who want·
ed to purchase securities for investment purposes, ruled that
it was constitutional for them to do so. In so ruling, this court
quoted the case of Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 91 S.E. 2d

660:
Use of the State's funds for purchase of securicies
for the State's benefit is not an extension of "credit"
which poses any threat to the financial security or wel·
fare of the State. Extending its credit to aid and pro·
mote private enterprise was the evil from _which the
State had suffered financially. The potential danger
incurred in lending credit to f?ster and proi:io:e ~:
interests of those who had no nghtful claim, in JUSttcil
or in morals, to the State's help or relief was ~e ~v
to be arrested. When the underlying and a~vanng
purpose of the transaction and the financial obhgat!O:
incurred are for the State's benefit, there is no lend·
ing of its credit though it may have expended its~ '.
or incurred an obligation that benefits another. ere
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ly because the State incurs an indebtedness or expends
its funds for its benefit and others may incidentally
profit thereby does not bring the transaction within
the letter or the spirit of the 'credit clause' prohibition.

Our contention is that the utility companies are nothing more
than incidental beneficiaries.
This court has deferred to a legislative determination of
what is a public purpose. The interest in securing water, treating sewage or promoting industry and relocating utility lines
have all been declared as needed public purposes. It is urged
that the legislative determination that the safety and aesthetics
of the burying of overhead utilities is a public purpose and 1s
certainly not "arbitrary or without rational basis".

Fisher, et al vs. City of Astoria, 269 P.853, 128 Oregon
268, 60 ALR 260 was a similar case of special district for street
lighting involving a change from old wood pole lights to more
attractive metal pole lights, the Court said:
The City contends that placing a lighting system
in a district of municipality constitutes a local improvement, and that the property in the district may
properly be assessed to pay for the benefit thus conferred; the plaintiffs take the opposite position based
upon the information contained in the Complaint, we
assume that the proposed lighting system eliminates
the cedar poles generally employed in Oregon cities
for the purpose of holding in suspense arc lights and in
lieu of the method substitutes metal posts of an attractive appearance and lamps of great brilliance. Since
the resolution specifies an up-to-date system, we assume that the wires which will convey the electric current to the lamps will be underground. It is common
know ledge that many businessmen and property own-

9

ers believe that such a lighting system renders h
.
h
t e
streets more attractive to t e retail trade and thus en.
h ance values. Before the expense of installing an im.
p~ov~me_nt. can be . assessed against the property in a
district, 1t 1s essential that improvement should conf
a substantial benefit upon the property within t~r
district. It may incident~lly benefit the entire City~
that wholesome effect will not destroy its use as the
foundation for a l?Ca! assessmen:, provided it brings
to the proposed district a benefit substantially more
intense than it yields to the rest of the municipality.
This case like our present case involves a public street to be
used by the public and those immediately in the district. The
fact that one is for more attractive lighting and the other is to
simply do away with less attractive poles does not alter the
public purpose involved.
The assertions made by the Appellant's brief on page 14
thereof is without merit. That is, that there can be no im·
provement district without the consent of the property owners
within the district. State Statute §54-8-6; Ordinance §39·7·6,
indicates as follows:
Any governing body may, upon a petition signed
by two-thirds of the owners of the real property and
the owners of not less than two-thirds in value of the
real property, as shown by the last assessme~t poles of
any proposed district requesting the creauon of an
improvement district as provided in this chapt~r, p-as.5
a resolution that any regular or special meenng de·
daring that it finds the improvement district prop:>Sed
as in the public interest.
State Statute §54-8-4; Ordinance §39-7-4, does empower the
· 1·
ent district
local governing body to create a speoa improvem
.
86
but only subject to the conditions of State Statute §54- · ,
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Ordinance § 39-7-6. This is in harmony with 10-16-7 ( 3),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, wherein the Municipal Improvement District Act makes the same provisions that two-thirds of
the property owners must file objections. Furthermore, this
is not a legitimate issue in this matter inasmuch as there was
a petition by over two-thirds of the property owners in favor
of the local improvements district.
Just as in the case of the Municipal Improvement District Act, there can in fact be created an improvement district
over the objections of those who may not wish it and be required to pay for it. It makes no difference that one-third or
less of the property owners in the district may not agree with
the environmental objectives and public policies set by the
State and by local governing body. Those same persons may
not agree with the public policy of having streets or street
lighting or curbs and gutters but may in a like manner be
swept into the 20th century against their will if they are out
voted in the project.
The Appellant's brief has raised the concern that the
Public Utility hire their own contractors and supervise their
own work. It would appear that this court could take judicial
notice of the complexities of high powered electrical and telephone wires in and around homes and the need for the expertise and skill that the Utilities would have in seeing that
the work was properly done. The implication of the Appellant's argument is that the taxpayer would suffer because there
wasn't customary open competitive bidding through the local
governing body with the City Engineer inspecting. By the same
token, the Utility doesn't prosper under this system. They have
nothing to gain. They had a satisfactory system above the
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ground and all they want to see is that there is going to be a
satisfactory system beneath the ground. Their objective is to
have a trouble free system that will provide regular and continuous service. They submit their estimates to the local governing body based upon their judgment as to how much the
work will cost without profit to themselves.
Appellant indicates that a utility is required to provide
service to those who request it. The implication is that they
are required to provide overhead service to those that request
it. However, the Underground Conversion of Utilities Act has
indicated that it now is the policy of this State to bury the overhead utilities whenever possible. The Underground Con·
version of Overhead Utilities and this lawsuit deal with older
residential areas where the public utilities have already been
installed.
It is not true that a resident can pay cash to the utility
and obtain underground utilities in an older neighborhood.
What affects one resident with regard to the burying of over·
head utilities, affects his neighbor. Thus, in order to accom·
plish this public purpose and certainly to make it economically
feasible, the wires over several homes must be buried at the
same time. Further, the benefit does not flow to the property
owner alone and certainly not to the public utility. The public
utility is more than content to leave the lines above ground.
The public purpose is to bury the overhead utilities whenever
possible for the safety and esthetics of everyone. This law
is simply a vehicle to allow those who are willing to pay,
through an improvement district, the opportunity to accom·
plish that purpose.

12

C.

The State Statute and Ordinance Do Not Delegate
Municipal Functions to Private Corporations.

Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 U.2d 412, 375 P.2d
756 ( 196 2 ) sets forth the conditions which are necessary to
violate Article VI, Section 29, of the Utah Constitution. They
are:
" ( 1) Delegation to a private commission or
power to ( 2) interfere with municipal property, or
( 3) to perform a municipal function."
Clearly the special improvement district to bury overhead public utilities does not violate any one of the three conditions herein mentioned. There is no private commission.
The governing board of the municipality operates as the commission. There is no interference with municipal property
other than a right-of-way which is granted whether the utility
lines are above or below the ground. It does not perform a
municipal function heretofore performed. It would be difficult to reason that the municipality should undertake to bury
the overhead utilities or, indeed, to erect them. A long time
ago that power was turned over to the utility companies under
the supervision of the Public Service Commission of the State.
There is no delegation of power to a "special commission" referred to in Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48
P.2d 530 ( 1935) in the concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe.
The power is clearly vested in the municipal governing body.
It might be said that this is a quasi-improvement district, inasmuch as there is no governing body other than the City Commission and inasmuch as its delegated responsibility, by
statute, is to cause the work to be performed, then the function
is completed.
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Argument is made by the Appellants that thi"s 1eg1s·1a.
.
tlve plan contemplates delegating powers to private interests
The private , interests referred to are the petitioners' 0 r prop-.
erty o~~ers aff~cted, and the power referred to is the right
to petition. This goes beyond the Municipal Improvement
District Act, §10-16-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, wherein
it states that the municipality itself may initiate the projea.
However, as a practical matter, in most of the improvements
(namely, curb and gutter and sidewalk) the municipalities
await the petition of the residents of an area rather than initiat·
ing the proposal themselves. The Act in question simply codifies that which has been done in the past and is being done
under present law.
The Appellants question the fact that the utilities were
charged with the responsibility of determining the feasibility
and not the governing body or the municipality. It might be
redundant to suggest that the average municipality is not
equipped technically to review or assess the requirements of
public utilities, as far as feasibility of installation is concerned.
Beyond that, the feasibility studies provided by the utilities
are born of their own expense, for which they are not com·
pensated. Certainly, there is nothing in Article VI, Section 29,
of the Utah Constitution requiring the governing body to in·
itiate the proposal nor to make a determination of feasibility
nor to provide continued supervision of the project. As men·
tioned before, the need for providing supervision of under·
ground utilities is no greater than the need to provide ~uper·
vision for overhead utilities, which this municipality is not
competent to do and, by statute, has no authority to do.

14

Clearly there is no offense to Article VI, Section 29, of
the Utah Constitution in this Act. All the power there is to
have is given to the municipality, which Article VI, Section 29,
seeks to protect. Simply stated, the municipality has power
given to them that they did not have before, and no power
taken from them which they did have before.
POINT

II

THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCES DO
NOT VIOLA TE THE DEBT LIMIT AND ELECTION PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

The language of the State Statute §54-8-22; Ordinance
§39-7-24 is perfectly clear. It provides that bonds "shall be
secured by and payable from the irrevocable pledge in dedication to the funds derived from the levy and collection of
the special assessments in anticipation of the collection of which
are issued." The language is unmistakable. The funds to pay
these obligations are to be taken from the levy and special
assessments and not from any other source.
A common rule of statutory construction m Norville v.
State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937, 126 ALR
1318, where Justice Wolfe made the following observations:
"Statutes duly enacted by the lagislature are presumed to be
constitutional and valid (citations) . When there is ambiguity
in the terms of the statute or when it is susceptible of two
interpretations, one of which would render it unconstitutional
and the other bring it within constitutional sanctions, the Court
is bound to choose the interpretation which will uphold the
statute, and to pronounce a statute unconstitutional only when

15

the c'.15e is so clear as to be free from doubt." (citations) Further m their opinion, the Court said "moreover 1·n se k.
.
.
'
e mg to
give _effect to t~e mtent of ~e legislature, the Court will adopt
the mterpretat1on of a taxrng statute which lowers th e tax
burden uniformly on all standing in the same degree with re.
lation to the tax adopted (citations), and will avoid an interpretation which would lead to an unpractical, unfair or unreasonable result."

The Appellant's interpretation is distinguishable from the
plain language of the statute, that is to tax only those who live
within the district. There is likely only two interpretations
available to the Court. By accepting the Appellant's interpretation, it would render the statute unconstitutional. Whereby,
accepting the literal meaning of the words, would render the
statute constitutional. Further, the interpretation of the Appellants would lead to an impractical, unfair and unreasonable
result. That is, taxing everyone for the benefits which have
been sought by a few.
Under a well settled rule of statutory construction of
Statutes in pari materia, statutes are not to be considered as
isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as parts of a
great, connected, homogenous system, or as a single and com·
plete statutory arrangement. Indeed, as a general rule, where
legislation dealing with a particular subject consists of a sys·
tern of related general provisions indicative of a settle palicy,

.

dto

new enactments of a fragmentary action on the subiect an
be carried into effect conformally to it, and they should be 50
construed as to harmonize the general tenor or purport of the
·
· a ll its
· pa rts and uJJJ· ,
system and make the skeem consistent
m
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form m its operation, unless a different purpose is shown,
50 Am. Jur. 349, Statutes. See also Norville v. State Tax Commission, supra.
There is no clear and precise language in the State Statute
§54-8-22; Ordinance §39-7-24 on this subject that materially
differ from Sections 10-16-27 and 10-16-29, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
In Engelking v. Investment Board, 458 P.2d 213, the
Supreme Court of Idaho ruled that the Idaho Endowment Investment Board could invest in stocks and bonds. The Idaho
court said:
The use of the "credit" as used in the provision
implies the imposition of some new financial liability
upon the State which in effect results in the creation
of a State debt for the benefit of private enterprise.
This was the evil intended to be remedied by the Idaho
Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 2, and similar provisions
in other State Constitutions. Yet that particular evil
is not presented by the investment of existing State
funds of the State for no new State debt is created by
such action.

In the case of Schureman v. State Highway Commission,
377 Mich. 609, 141 N.W. 2d 62 (1966), the Supreme Court
of Michigan argued that revenue bonds and special obligation
bonds share an essential distinction from general obligation
bonds. The credit of the State is pledged for the payment of
general obligation bonds. It is not for revenue bonds and
special obligation bonds. Special obligation bonds are retired
from special tax revenues earmarked for that purpose.
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The language of State Statutes §54-8-22, Utah Code An.
notated, and Ordinance §39-7-24 is helpful in dete · ·
.
'
m~~
the nature of the bonds issued under this Act. It says:
The bonds shall be dated no earlier than the dat
?n which the special assessment shall begin to bea~
~merest, and shall be secured by and payable from the
irrevocable pledge and dedication of the funds derived from ~he le~- an~ the collection of the special
assessments m ant1C1pat1on of the collection of which
they are issued.
These are special obligation bonds retired by special tax revenues and would become a lien upon the adjacent property il
not paid.
POINT

III

THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCE
PROVIDE AMPLE DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The issue raised under Point III, "hearings which are
merely an empty formality and where no real determinations
of the merit of objections are considered, does not constitute
due process of law." Probably this statute, more than any
other of its kind, provides ample due process. A review of that
due process might be helpful to the Court.
State Statute §54-8-6; Ordinance §39-7-6 requires that
two-thirds of the owners of the property in the district must
petition the City for the creation of an improvement district.
In those same sections, the City Commission is required to (a)
seek a response from the public utilities within 120 days, of the
cost of converting the overhead utilities; ( b) provide a list of
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the name and address of each property owner in the district,
and ( c) determine the square footage of each property within
the district.
In State Statute §54-8-7; Ordinance §39-7-7, the utilities
at their expense prepare a feasibility study indicating firstly
if the project is possible or feasible and secondly, how much
it would cost to convert from overhead to underground. It is
well to note here that the utilities are the only entity with the
available expertise and understanding of power and telephonic
transmissions to either determine feasibility and cost involved
in the conversion. It is not reasonable in dealing with potentially dangerous instrumentalities such as power lines, that City
or County personnel attempt to make determinations about or
install or repair such specialized equipment.
Statutes §54-8-8; Ordinance §39-7-8 requires that after
the City has received the reports and estimates from the utilities that they consider whether or not to create a local improvement district. If the reports are favorable and all systems
are go, they pass a resolution declaring their intention to
create such a district, including in the resolution the cost and
expenses to be levied, the need to promote the public welfare
through this conversion and also include the areas and boundaries and their intention to hold a public hearing.
State Statute §54-8-9; Ordinance §39-7-9 require that
after the passage of the resolution the governing body shall
cause notice of the public hearing on the proposed improvement to ( a) be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the district; ( b) a copy of such notice shall be mailed
by certified mail to the last known address of each owner of
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land within the proposed district; ( c) that in addition
.
.
, a copy
of said notice shall be addressed "Owner" and shall be mailed
to the street number of each piece of improved property to be
effected by the assessment in the district.
That Notice that is sent out and published not only describe the boundary but describes how the project will be
carried out with an estimate of the costs and indicates that it
is intended to assess the abutting property owners. In addition
it indicates the time and place for the proposed hearing and'
indicates that all interested persons would be heard on the
matter.
State Statute §54-8-11; Ordinance §39-7-18 describe the
nature of the hearing which is mainly to hear all objections,
to allow the utility company to propose any changes or to
allow city residents or the utility company to propose any
changes in the feasibility report.
The proposed assessment list is prepared after the hearing
and in State Statute § 5 4-8-16; Ordinance § 39-7-17 another
notice is mailed by certified letter and by regular mail as well
as published in a paper of general circulation indicating the
specific assessments on each person's property involved in the
improvement district. Thereafter, a public hearing is held again
on the assessment resolutions as well as a Board of Equaliza.
tion consisting of three members of the Commission to make
any corrections in the assessment.

In Elkins, et al v. Millard County Drainage District No.
3, et al, 294 P. 307, 77 Utah 270, this Court looked at the
formation of a drainage district. The following procedure was
followed:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Petition by a majority of the land owners.
A hearing set
Notice of hearing
The Board could exclude land from the District.
The Board determined the benefits were in excess of the cost.
The Board created the District.
The Board of Equalization said they appeal to the
Court.

In 1930 this Court held that in such procedure there was
due process.
POINT

IV

THE METI-IOD OF ASSESSMENT IS
CONSTIWTIONAL
The Respondent does not argue with the proposmon
stated in the Appellant's brief that the "assessment should not
exceed the special benefit to the property." However, this
principle of law does not apply in this matter to an assessment
by square footage of the property.
Sidewalks, as an example, usually go along the frontage of a property. The same is true of curb and gutter. Not
so with overhead utilities. Overhead utilities can attach a
man's yard from almost any direction. Go across the back line,
cut diagonally across it or go along the side yard. There are
certainly no limitations as to how such an overhead utility
might traverse a lot.
Further, the benefit of burying the overhead utility for
the assessed property owner is not the amount of electricity
flowing through the wires to the home, but the sight and
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safety of the wires. That concept, heretofore stated is to clean
up the neighborhood and the community and make 1·t more
attractive and pleasing to the eye. This can be accomplished in
part by burying of the overhead utilities. Those whose years
exceed the writer of this brief probably can remember the
downtown streets of Salt Lake when they were cluttered with
overhead utilities. Their removal has blessed everyone, and
make for a more attractive community. Not just the adjacent
property owners benefit and certainly not benefit the adjacent
property owners according to the amount of electrical current
they utilize.
A fair and equitable way to assess the removal of over·
head utilities is on a square footage basis per lot. This is par·
ticularly so for one who owns a lot on the corner. Front foot·
age to him is onerous. Certainly, under this formula there is
no gain to anyone, least of all the Utilities. The Legislature
simply attempted to find an equitable way to assess those in
the improvement district. The Legislature had no concept as
to how each individual lot would be shaped or how the over·
head utilities would cross the lot. Indeed it more fully fills
the requirement of Gast Realty Company v. Snyder Granite
Company, 240 U.S. 55, 33 S.Ct. 254, 60 L.Ed. 523, wherein
the United States Supreme Court stated that "substantial jus·
tice generally will be done," and that the parties should not
be taxed "disproportionately to each other and to the benef'.t
conferred." From many standpoints this is probably more fall
and equitable than any previously used method for such im·
provements.
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In 1916 the Supreme Court of Utah held that property
assessed on an acreage basis in a drainage District was constitutional. That case was Ferry v. Corrinne Drainage District of
Box Elder County, 156 Pac. 921, 48 Utah 1.

The Appellants have dabbled in much speculation in the
second point they raise in their second argument under this
subsection, stating that the public utilities benefit from the
underground utilities and, therefore, should pay a proportionate
cost of their installation. It is pure speculation to assume that
it is easier to repair the wire under the ground than it is up
on top of a pole. It is speculation to assume that a transformer,
several feet under the ground, is easier to get to in order to
adjust, repair or replace than one three or four feet above the
ground. The difference between climbing a pole or digging a
trench certainly cannot affect the constitutionality of this law.
The public utilities made an investment when they first
installed the overhead utilities. It is less expensive and considerably easier for the public utilities to maintain overhead
facilities and considerably less expensive for them to install.
It is the public, through their representatives in the legislature that sought and demanded cleaner air and less visual obstructions.

It is appropriate here to observe that utilities are governed
specifically under this Act by the Uniform System of Accounts.
(State Statutes §54-8-24; Ordinance §39-7-26) This is the
same system of accounting required by the Public Service Commission, the Federal Communications Commission and the
Federal Power Commission for the utilities. Interestingly, this
formula, set forth in the Code sections above, require the util-
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ities to take "the original cost less depreciation taken f h
· .
.
o te
ex1stmg overhead electric and communication facility to be .
moved." It is clear with inflation as it is on the cost of the::.
placement system utilities would be much better off
··
.
. .
receiving
fair market value for the ex1st10g system rather than the origi·
nal cost less depreciation. Under the present conditions of
inflation they could stand to lose considerably more than they
would gain.
Certainly, if the public utility were a neighbor as part of
a special improvement district, they, of course, would be obligated to pay their share of the cost.

POINT

V

THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCE
PERMIT THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITH
JUST COMPENSATION.
There is a basic inconsistency m the Appellant's argu·
ment herein. State Statute §54-8-24; Ordinance §39-7-26 both
provide that sufficient monies will have to be obtained from
the levy and assessment to cover any additional easements that
need to be acquired. Presumably, the monies in question are
to purchase or acquire easements from the property owners.
It is true that they are making an assessment against all the
property owners for the purpose of acquiring those easements,
if any there be that need to be purchased, but there is no ques·
tion that those easements that need to be acquired will be paid
for in full with adequate compensation. As a practical matrer,
it is anticipated as in the present improvement district, that
most if not all of the property owners will be happy to conve)
an easement to the utility company to assist in getting the
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project underway. Flowers can be planted over an underground
utility easement as easily as they can be planted under an overhead wire and likely the flowers will prosper more.
Assuming there is no adequate easement, the Section
simply allows for the assessment of sufficient funds to pay for
easements.
State Statute §54-8-26; Ordinance §39-7-28 allows those
who wish to make the connections with the utilities to do it
themselves. The right to object in writing allows the property
owner to object and to make the connections himself and the
failure to object allows the utility company to enter his premises to connect the telephone and electrical power lines. It
must be borne in mind that the caution with which the service
lines are placed in the ground are as important to those living
there as to the utilities themselves. The same expertise that
requires the Utilities to bury the utilities or to supervise m
burying the utilities holds true for the service line.
CONCLUSION
The State Statute and Ordinance should be held constitutional for the reasons set forth. The Legislature has been
extremely careful in this law to provide for more than enough
safeguards to protect the public generally and specifically those
in the improvement districts. There is a significant public
benefit derived from this law. Inasmuch as new construction,
particularly in residential and downtown areas, is going in
without overhead utilities. This is a significant step forward in
cleaning up visual obstructions left by generations past.
Only those in the improvement district are taxed and the credit
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of the community is not pledged for this debt. The only roll
the utility companies play is that of using their expertise in
designing the system and seeing that it is properly constructed.
They make no profit nor receive any gain. All that is accom.
plished is an overhead utility system being replaced by an
underground utility system.
The decision below should be sustained, with instructions
to enter judgment declaring the State Statute and Ordinance
constitutional and for a denial of the injunction.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN PRESTON CREER

Piercey, Bradford & Marsden
1700 University Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
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